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Eric W. Sager with Gerald E. Panting- Maritime Capital. The Shipping Industry in 
Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914. Montreal and Kingston: MeGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1990. Pp. xviii, 289. 
This book was inspired by the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project, which from 
1977, through very generous Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada (SHRCC) funding, elevated Canadian maritime historical writing to interna-
tional prominence. Winner of the 1991 Keith Matthews Prize from the Canadian 
Association of Nautical Research, it was an excellent example of the wise use of 
research funding by the SSHRCC. No historian has either benefited or contributed 
more to this effort than Eric Sager, whose Seafaring Labour. The Merchant Marine of 
Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914 (1989) was favourably reviewed. 
It is difficult for us to grasp the importance of shipping to the economies of the 
Maritime provinces before 1914, for today Canada's deep sea fleet is inconsequential. 
With 1.3 million tons on registry by 1880 - the vast bulk of them built in the 
Maritime provinces-, the Canadian fleet was at least for a very short time the fourth 
largest worldwide after the UK, USA and Norway. Thereafter, shipbuilding in the 
Maritime provinces collapsed, and by 1900, the wooden fleet had been reduced by 
two-thirds. When a new shipbuilding boom occurred during the Great War (1914-
1918), it took place less in the Maritime provinces than in Ontario and Quebec. 
The authors explain why Maritime shipowners, despite vast experience both in 
shipbuilding and in trade, did not invest in iron, steam-powered ships when they 
became essential to overseas commerce. Their answer is found partly in more 
attractive investment opportunities elsewhere in Canada from the 1870s, and partly in 
the very outlook of the merchant elite of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia who, before 
1914, dominated shipping. They instinctively understood the economic theory of 
comparative advantage, and saw that the cost of substitution of iron for wood and 
steam for sail were comparatively higher in the Maritimes than in the United 
Kingdom, so shipowning and shipbuilding in Canada lost its appeal. 
They see deep-sea shipping as a form of exploitation of colonial labour and 
resources, serving the interest of merchant capital, which contributed to their un-
contested dominance as the elite of Atlantic Canada for much of the nineteenth 
century. Ships were essential to the merchants' control of markets and hence their 
annual profits and accumulated wealth. More controversially, they suggest that this 
merchant-dominated economy retarded the prospect of sustained growth and 
economic diversification. To do this, they have to ignore agriculture, which absorbed 
more capital and was more important to the Maritime economies in any given year 
than shipping and shipbuilding. They wrote: 
To the extent that locally built fleets helped to establish and to preserve 
merchant dominance, petty commodity production, and even non-capitalist 
social relations, the shipping industries contributed to relatively slow transition 
to industrial capitalism (18). 
The expanding capitalist sector in mining (coal and iron), sawmilling, ship-
building and in shipping sustained small rural proprietors, who supplied the needs of 
the merchant shipowners. 
Building upon the work of other Canadian scholars of shipping, forest industry 
and merchant elite- notably Graham, Lower, McClelland, Alexander, Matthews, 
Rice, Sutherland, Acheson and Wynn -and adding their own innovative research, 
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they provide details of the changing face of the shipping industry. Initially, it answered 
the needs of regional trade while, later, it became international. Their sample covers 
the eight principle ports, led by Saint John, and 80 percent of all tonnage on colonial 
registry. After 1815, they demonstrate, as others have, that vessels were increasingly 
built for sale in the UK and elsewhere, and by the mid-1840s, as the UK market began 
to whither, ships were built almost exclusively for Maritime shipowners who carried 
on trade from ports other than in British North America. 
The explanation of why colonials wanted to own wooden sailing vessels, which 
their British competitors were increasingly after the 1830s disinclined to buy, they 
find in state policies in the UK, USA, and in the Maritime colonies and provinces. 
They also assign responsibility to the Crimean War, the 1854-1866 Reciprocity 
Treaty, the US Civil War and the restructuring of colonial import duties. The Crimean 
War stimulated shipping demand and added to inflation, though the authors are largely 
guessing about its impact on the shipping industry. They are in safer waters when 
adopting Matthews' view that the Civil War stripped the high seas of US shipping and 
created heightened but short-term international demands for shipping. This left British 
North American shippers well placed to assume a commanding presence as carriers 
for US trade. This ocean shipping phase, however impressive and proud the achieve-
ment, proved far less enduring and perhaps less important than the building of fishing 
and coastal schooners which remained part of the "regional economy well into the 
twentieth century" (88). 
Additionally, they argue that the growth in Maritime ownership of oceanic 
shipping was a function of limited export opportunities. For Nova Scotia, this meant 
fish, wood and agricultural products which, in most years, comprised about three-
quarters of the value of her exports. For some reason, they ignore re-exports, so 
important in the Caribbean trade. They argue, with little evidence, and, here, social 
historians will be interested that, as wealth from importing and exporting these goods 
was slow to expand, rapacious Maritimers embarked on an extensive ownership of 
deepsea vessels to carry both their own goods and, more importantly, the freight of 
foreign merchants between foreign ports. 
The authors attempt to estimate merchant wealth, which continued to rise, they 
believed, until the 1870s. They make shrewd guesses about shipping profits (133ft) 
by taking samples of vessels registered at Saint John, Yarmouth, Halifax and Windsor, 
which entered London and Liverpool in 1863, 1873 and 1883. They conclude that 
"most ships were earning 20 percent or more of the value of the capital employed" 
(135). Another way to estimate wealth has been satisfactorily achieved by the use of 
probate records, but this, they did not attempt. One such study shows that wealth 
accumulated by the elite accounted for almost all new wealth in the 1850s and 1860s. 
It was the sharp decline in economic prospects from the mid-1870s for owners of 
wooden ships which led to the flight from this form of investment. Before that, they 
cut labour costs by reducing man/ton ratios, so that fewer men were used to work the 
same tonnage on faster crossings. By ensuring that real wages fell, shipowners forced 
Maritimers away from all but the coastal and regional routes, and substituted cheaper 
labour from abroad. 
One of the reasons to explain the timing of the decline of wooden ship building 
- deforestation - they did not consider. Cape Breton, for instance, and much of 
Nova Scotia, by the early 1860s, had trashed its forest of species useful for ship-
building. Spruce, slow-growing and for ship building inferior, alone remained in 
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abundance, but the best of that had all but disappeared. Unchecked new growth was 
largely balsam, a wood useless for ships, but with a limited market as mine props and 
a larger later market for paper making. Deforestation accounts for the early disap-
pearance of shipbuilding in Cape Breton and Pictou, as much as the opportunities 
which simultaneously opened in the 1860s for investment in coal mining. 
Thereafter, Maritime shipyards were celebrated only for their exceedingly fast 
but ugly rum-runners and beautiful but archaic wooden-hulled sailing schooners. The 
Bluenose, the most famous of these, is thus more a symbol of poverty and backward-
ness, which characterized Nova Scotia in the 1920s when she was built, than of a 
vigorous, modern industrialized economy, which so many confident shipowners of 
the 1860s believed was just over the horizon. This, the authors, with much financial 
support, scholarly encouragement and cooperation, have so usefully portrayed. 
*** 
Julian Gwyn 
University of Ottawa 
Adrian Shubert -A Social History of Modern Spain. London: Unwin Hyman 
Limited, 1990. Pp. x, 292. 
This is a richly innovative, thematically taut analysis of the formation of modern 
Spanish society, that process by which Spanish men and women adjusted their lives 
to the fundamental forces of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (a market 
economy, urbanization, industrialization) and to the cultural and social consequences. 
Spaniards, moreover, had to do so in terms and ways congruent with their traditional 
institutional and intellectual structures if they were to be successful. Divorced from 
ideology, the terminology neutral, Shubert's text recounts the adaptation of old and 
creation of new social groups; the configuration and re-configuration of a system of 
relationships at the national and regional level; and the conflicts engendered in this 
process which the Liberal State tried to resolve at the same time it sought to develop 
an identity and an efficient governing mechanism. Chronologically, Shubert organizes 
his data in an attempt to explain why these efforts ended in failure with the Spanish 
Civil War of 1936, and why they have succeeded since 1975. 
Spain's progress toward an advanced industrial society and a democratic state 
(under a monarchy, the only one restored in twentieth-century Europe, as emblem of 
the traditional) is firmly sited within the European pathway: "Longer and more 
circuitous, but ultimately it led to the same place" (262). As for the much debated 
'bourgeois revolution' of the Marxist proof texts, scholarly evidence now suggests 
that the transformation of European economies was not carried out abruptly, nor by a 
new social class, either in its economic or its political phase. 
We have now a framework for future research: not that Spain is 'different' (a 
view so ably exploited by Franco for tourist profit, inter alia), but rather a variant of 
the European experience and as such offering data for social historians that is as 
valuable as that of France or Germany to flesh out the tired but necessary concept of 
'Modernization'. Balancing statistics with anecdotes and enriching it with workers' 
autobiographical perceptions, Shubert recounts the way that men, women and 
children began to live longer; moved to cities or emigrated to Latin America or Europe 
